The Iran talks almost collapsed over Lebanon.
Iran suspended nuclear talks over Israel’s Lebanon offensive. President Donald Trump intervened directly, stopping Israeli troops already moving toward Beirut. The 14-point framework for ending the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz was at stake. The pause is conditional. Israel is waiting for Trump’s final approval before any Beirut operation resumes.
Also this week: Trump threatened to “blow up” Oman, a United States partner for nearly 200 years, and the country that has mediated between Washington and Tehran throughout this conflict. In Lebanon, Washington is sanctioning Nabih Berri’s closest allies without sanctioning Berri himself. Iran’s internet came back after 90 days – and restoring a lucrative source of income for the Revolutionary Guards along the way. And Egypt quietly closed its military position near the Ethiopian border, losing a forward post in its contest over the Nile.
Mustafa Saadoon, Rami Al Amine, Rasha Ibrahim, Dalshad Hussein, Sakina Abdallah, Ezat Wagdi Ba Awaidhan, and Ringo Harrison contributed to the Agenda this week.
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MBN Iran Briefing Podcast
Expert conversations unpacking the latest developments in Iran and how they are reshaping security, energy markets, and geopolitics across the Middle East.
Washington Watch
Trump Stops a Strike
Israel was moving troops toward Beirut today. President Donald Trump personally stopped them.
Trump posted on Truth Social that no Israeli troops would enter Beirut and that Hezbollah had agreed that all shooting would stop. Lebanon itself was not the reason. Iran had suspended its talks with the U.S. on Monday morning over Israel’s Lebanon offensive. Trump intervened to protect the diplomatic architecture of the 14-point Memorandum of Understanding, the draft framework to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
The Lebanese Presidency confirmed the sequence on X: After a call between President Joseph Aoun and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Lebanese authorities received confirmation that Hezbollah agreed to the American proposal. Trump then called Lebanon’s Ambassador to the U.S., Nada Moawad, and confirmed that he had received Netanyahu’s agreement. She then conveyed the results to Aoun, who informed Hezbollah. The proposed arrangement: Israel would stop its strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs in exchange for Hezbollah stopping attacks on Israel, with both sides then working toward a full ceasefire across all of Lebanon.
Nabih Berri, Lebanon’s parliament speaker, sent a message through his adviser, Ali Hamdan, to U.S. Ambassador to Beirut Michel Issa: Hezbollah was “totally ready to commit to a comprehensive ceasefire.” Berri rejected Washington’s partial formula and demanded one that would apply to the whole country. U.S. and Israeli officials told Axios they doubted Netanyahu would agree and questioned whether Berri could enforce Hezbollah’s compliance.
A senior State Department official told MBN: “The president was clear today with Prime Minister Netanyahu that escalation in Beirut would not serve that objective. That is why the president intervened directly.”
The pause is conditional. Two Israeli officials told Reuters that Israel would “wait for Trump’s final approval” before any Beirut operation.
The occupation logic has not changed. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has announced a permanent security zone south of the Litani River, modeled on Israel’s approach in Gaza of establishing buffer zones through demolition and displacement. Netanyahu crossed the Litani on May 30, captured Beaufort Castle, a fortress Israel held during its previous 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon, and ordered troops to deepen their control.
The June 2-3 talks open today. Whether the ceasefire holds long enough to reach the table is the question no one has answered.
Lebanon Watch
Squeezing Berri
Washington is not yet sanctioning Nabih Berri, Lebanon’s parliament speaker and leader of the Amal Movement, the Shiite political party that has dominated Lebanese politics alongside Hezbollah for decades. But it is getting closer.
Last week, the Treasury Department designated two of his closest associates: Ahmad Baalbaki, described by Lebanese political observers as his right-hand man, and Ali Ahmad Safawi, an Amal military official accused of coordinating fighters alongside Hezbollah in attacks against Israel.
Hanin Ghaddar, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told MBN the strategy is to separate Berri from Hezbollah without eliminating him from Lebanese politics. “If the pressure on his allies changes his behavior, the campaign stops there. If not, future designations could target his family members or financial assets abroad.”
The dilemma is structural. Amal and Hezbollah together dominate Shiite political representation in Lebanon. Lebanese political activist Ali Mourad, who ran against both parties in the last elections, told MBN that directly sanctioning Berri risks pushing the Shiite community to rally around him, and could trigger a confrontation between Amal and Hezbollah reminiscent of their violent clashes in the late 1980s.
Washington is betting that the war’s destruction in Shiite areas has weakened Hezbollah enough to create space for a new political alternative. That bet has not yet been tested.
Read the full analysis here
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Quote Of The Day
“Unfortunately, some consider negotiation to be surrender, but it is not; nor is it a concession, but rather a solution to stop wars with the least possible harm.”
–Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, June 1, 2026
Gulf Watch
Warning a Friend
Muskat, Oman: Reuters.
President Donald Trump threatened to “blow up” Oman. Oman has been a partner of the United States for nearly 200 years.
The threat exposed a tension at the heart of Washington’s Hormuz strategy: The country most useful as a mediator between the United States and Iran is now being treated as a suspect.
The remark came after Iranian state media reported a draft arrangement that would give Tehran and Muscat joint management of the Strait of Hormuz, which contradicts the U.S. position that travel through Strait must remain free of any state-imposed restrictions. The Trump administration called the plan “entirely fabricated.” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent threatened Oman with measures if it supported any toll system, then said he had received Omani assurances that no such plan existed. Trump’s comment followed hours later.
Oman’s role in this conflict has not been adversarial. Its foreign minister was meeting U.S. officials one day before the war began, describing unprecedented progress in negotiations. Giorgio Cafiero, chief executive of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy, told MBN the administration “may no longer be willing to tolerate Oman’s longstanding policy of relative neutrality.” Kristin Smith Diwan, a senior scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, told MBN the pattern is troubling. “Oman has been distinguishing itself for its vocal advocacy of a settlement with Iran. This does make it more of a target for those championing military escalation.”
Trump does not appear to want to end Oman’s role as mediator. He appears to want to set its terms.
Read the full reporting here
Iran Watch
Connected, at a Price
Tehran, Iran, Jan. 25, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/West Asia News Agency (WANA) via Reuters.
Iran’s internet came back after nearly 90 days of restrictions. The Revolutionary Guard Corps came with it.
The return of connectivity has exposed a built-in contradiction: The Revolutionary Guard restricted internet access during the war and is now among those profiting from selling Iranians the tools to get around it. Now, its officials are threatening to extend that same logic to the undersea cables running through the Strait of Hormuz.
Jafar Bakhtiari, who runs a small leather workshop in Tehran, told MBN his monthly internet costs reached nearly 30 million tomans, roughly $170. Politically connected groups get near-open access. Zhila Mostajer of the rights group Hengaw told MBN that all access eventually passes through networks linked to the Guard. “People suffer from internet repression,” she said, “and then the same system gradually allows them to escape that repression for enormous sums.”
A senior Iranian cyberspace official said the country is moving toward China’s model, restricting global access for most citizens while expanding a more permissive domestic network for privileged users.
Iranian officials have floated the idea of imposing fees on undersea cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz. No fees have been collected. But experts told MBN the threat forces Gulf governments to consider internet security as part of the deterrence equation alongside oil and navigation.
Read the full MBN reporting on Iran’s internet economy here and on the cable threat here
Exclusive
Egypt’s Quiet Retreat
Egypt has quietly ended its military presence in South Sudan, MBN has learned. The closure exposes a significant shift in the Nile Basin’s political alignments at a moment when Cairo is already losing ground in its long dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile’s waters.
An Egyptian government official told MBN that roughly 260 personnel stationed in Pajok, a town in South Sudan’s Upper Nile State near the border triangle linking South Sudan, Sudan, and Ethiopia, had been conducting surveillance, training, and logistical coordination. Their proximity to Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, home to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the massive hydroelectric project on the Blue Nile that Egypt views as an existential threat to its water supply, gave Cairo operational visibility over one of its most sensitive national security concerns.
South Sudan requested the closure for four overlapping reasons. In 2024, it aligned itself with upstream Nile states through a water-sharing deal. Its economic ties with Ethiopia are growing. It is keen to avoid becoming a flashpoint between Sudan and Ethiopia. And President Salva Kiir used the expulsion to demonstrate sovereignty to his own population at a moment when his leadership is under domestic pressure.
“The closure does not paralyze Cairo’s broader regional strategy,” former Egyptian Assistant Foreign Minister Fawzi Ashmawy told MBN. Egypt continues to deepen ties with Eritrea, back the Sudanese army, and coordinate with Khartoum as the two downstream states press Ethiopia on the dam dispute.
Egypt just lost one of its forward positions in the contest over the Nile. That contest is not over.
Read the full exclusive here
