Two-State Solution.. in Yemen

Once divided along Cold War fault lines, for over two decades Yemen was split between an anti-communist North and a Soviet-aligned South. The two sides united in 1990, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, into a single republic that promised stability, but soon unraveled into conflict. 

Now, amid a grinding civil war and deepening divisions, one southern general is reviving the old dream of separation. This time, however, his vision is not rooted in 20th-century ideology but in a new geopolitical reality, one aligned with the Gulf states, the United States, and perhaps even the Abraham Accords. 

Maj. Gen. Aidarus al-Zoubaidi fought in Yemen’s 1994 war, led southern forces in 2015, and later became Aden’s governor. In 2017, he founded the Southern Transitional Council, which he now leads while serving as vice president of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council and promoting “the desired Arab South” – a vision for an independent southern state. 

“We are in a transitional federal phase, united by the need to confront the Houthis,” he says. “But the ultimate goal is a two-state solution: North and South.” 

A Fragile Unity 

When, in 1990, the Yemen Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south merged into a single state, the unification was hailed as the triumph of Arab brotherhood. Yet the optimism didn’t last. Four years later, war erupted. The South’s attempt to secede failed, and northern forces took Aden, hardening the conviction among some in the South that unity had turned from a partnership into an instrument of control. 

Out of the bitterness of that defeat grew the first organized calls for southern self-determination. In the early 2000s, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi’s Hatm movement emerged to challenge President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule from Sanaa. By 2007, disillusioned military and civil figures had coalesced into what became known as the Southern Movement, or al-Hirak. 

Then, in 2015, with Sanaa falling to the Houthis, the South’s struggle entered a new phase, this time under fire. The turning point came in 2017, when the Southern Transitional Council (STC) was declared – the political umbrella born of years of protest and battlefield coordination. 

Recently, al-Zoubaidi sat in a New York hotel surrounded by his advisors after a packed day of meetings at the U.N. General Assembly, ready to answer my questions. 

According to him, the Council grew from “the accumulation of the resistance and the southern movement,” forming “a political framework for the southern cause.” 

He said the STC’s legitimacy stems from the Riyadh Agreement, which allowed southern participation in Yemen’s government and representation in the Presidential Leadership Council, and from what he describes as widespread popular backing in the South. 

Still, the Council’s claim to represent the South remains a matter of debate among other southern figures and groups. 

Militarily, the STC has evolved beyond defense lines. Al-Zoubaidi said its forces “defend southern land from Houthi militias,” but they also fight further north, on fronts in Taiz and Hodeidah. 

One of his advisers put it more starkly: “The last war drew the map of the South and its borders.” 

The question that follows is unavoidable: Where, exactly, will those borders lie? 

Redrawing the Map 

Speaking a day before our interview at Columbia University in New York, al-Zoubaidi told the audience that “90 percent of the government’s territory is in the South,” while only “10 percent of the liberated areas are in the North, mostly in Marib and Taiz.” 

He went even further in his conversation with Alhurra: “Many residents of Marib and Taiz are asking to join the South.” He added:
“We welcome them within the geographic and political framework of the South.” 

It’s a vision that stretches well beyond the borders of pre-1990 Yemen and marks a decisive departure from the idea of national unity. 

“The coming state will not even carry the name Yemen,” he declared. 

Among his supporters, the favored new name is “The Arab South”, a nod to the federation created by the British when they unified southern sultanates before independence in 1967. 

The War That Never Ended

“We respect their will as northerners, and they respect the will of southerners. I believe there will be a two-state solution after the Houthis are gone,” al-Zoubaidi told Alhurra. 

For southern fighters, that confrontation has defined their role since 2015. When the Houthis stormed Aden’s presidential palace and military bases, the South’s militias regrouped and counterattacked. 

The United Arab Emirates played a pivotal part, training and equipping some 90,000 southern fighters and helping them retake 93 percent of the region, including Aden. 

Al-Zoubaidi insisted the resistance was never purely military: 

“The South aspires to a federal state where each governorate governs itself locally.” 

He credits the UAE as “brothers,” describing their backing as “foundational” in shaping southern forces. 

STC leader Mansour Saleh echoed the sentiment: 

“The Emirati support was generous and covered all aspects of life. Without it, we would have faced far more difficult and complex conditions.” 

Openness with Conditions

When the conversation turned to the Abraham Accords, al-Zoubaidi was cautious but clear: 

“The two-state solution between Israel and Palestine is the cornerstone for restoring the Abraham Accords to their natural form. The Arab South could be part of them if a Palestinian state is recognized alongside Israel.” 

He has said that a future southern state would seek official ties with Israel, while condemning Israeli actions in Gaza: 

“What is happening in Gaza has affected every Arab and Muslim, and on a human level, it’s unacceptable.” 

Asked how his colleagues in Yemen’s Presidential Council respond to his openness, he replied: 

“All members of the Presidential Council have faced exclusion and displacement from their lands … We recognize their right to self-determination.” 

 After the Houthis 

Al-Zoubaidi foresaw a “complex and lengthy” process ahead, but one that ends with two independent states. His roadmap begins with liberating the North from Houthi control, followed by negotiations that formalize separation, leaving the door open for expansion if some northern regions opt to join. 

He envisions “The Arab South” as a partner, not an outlier, in the region’s strategic alliances: 

“The Arab South will be a distinguished partner with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf, and an active member of the Gulf Cooperation Council.” 

At the global level, he seeks to anchor the South within a Gulf-American security architecture, leveraging its position on the Bab al-Mandab Strait and its untapped natural resources.