A fighter stands outside the security complex in Damascus, Syria, December 13, 2024. Reuters/Amro Al-Feki
As Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani’s plane touched down in Beijing, Agence France-Presse published a report quoting two unnamed Syrian sources saying that the Syrian authorities intend to transfer about 400 detainees from the Muslim Uyghur minority to China in the near future. Although Damascus categorically denied the report, its joint statement during the visit declared that Syria “will not allow its territory to be used for any activities that harm Chinese interests” — a clear reference to the issue of foreign fighters.
Responding to a question about reports that members of the “East Turkestan Islamic Movement” might be handed over to China, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said that combating that group “is an essential part” of China’s counterterrorism efforts. She added that Syria had pledged not to allow any party to use its territory to undermine China’s security, sovereignty, or interests, and that the two sides had agreed to “enhance coordination in the fields of security and counterterrorism.”
Human-rights organizations warn that any forcible return of Uyghurs to China would, in practice, mean handing them over to an extremely dangerous and opaque fate. In a statement to MBN, Omer Kanat, Executive Director of the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) based in Washington, said the risks of forcible repatriation in this case are “high.” He added that the Project has documented “hundreds” of cases of Uyghurs who were forcibly returned to China from various countries, “and none of them is known to have resumed a normal life.” Kanat explained that those repatriated often face enforced disappearance, harsh prison sentences on terrorism-related charges, or even execution in some cases. These risks, he said, are not speculative are a well-documented pattern of widespread abuses in Xinjiang Province — including arbitrary detention, torture, and cultural and religious persecution — making any forced transfer “a flagrant violation of international law.”
According to Kanat, a 2022 UHRP report documented at least 292 cases of Uyghurs who were detained or deported from Arab countries at China’s request since 2001 — including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Morocco, and Syria. Many of these cases were linked to Egypt’s wide-ranging July 2017 crackdown on Uyghur students, most of them studying at Al-Azhar University, which resulted in the forcible deportation of dozens of individuals to China, where they faced arrest upon arrival. At least two died in custody, according to UHRP documents. Kanat added that Saudi Arabia deported at least six Uyghurs in 2017. Asked what message any transfers to China by the Syrian authorities would send, Kanat told MBN that “any forcible deportation would send a signal to all host countries that China can reach Uyghurs anywhere,” deepening the climate of “cross-border repression” that Beijing has built over the years.
Uyghur fighters have appeared on the Syrian battlefield since the early years of the 2011 uprising, mainly within armed factions in northern Syria — particularly the Turkistan Islamic Party, which is allied with other groups in Idlib. Their total number is estimated at about 15,000, including roughly 500 active combatants. According to the AFP report, China has opposed integrating these fighters into any military or security forces and has pressed for their repatriation — or at least for stripping them of combatant status — to prevent Syria from becoming a safe haven for militants whom Beijing considers part of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), designated by both China and the United Nations as a terrorist organization. To understand why the Uyghur issue weighs so heavily on the Syrian-Chinese rapprochement, it helps to look at a closely related precedent.
A recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, titled “China’s Adaptation to Taliban 2.0,” argues that Beijing’s strategy in Afghanistan rests on two pillars: addressing its direct security concerns — especially the risk of threats spelling over from Afghanistan into the Uyghur-majority Xinjiang region — and safeguarding its economic interests in Central Asia by engaging whoever holds actual control on the ground. In other words, China is willing to work with any de-facto authority, including the Taliban, as long as it can restrain Uyghur militant groups and prevent them from using Afghan territory as a rear base. This logic led Beijing to keep its embassy open in Kabul after the Taliban takeover, to engage the group diplomatically and economically, and to offer limited incentives in exchange for security guarantees primarily related to the Uyghurs. In juxtaposition to the Syrian context, the pattern appears similar: Beijing seeks explicit assurances from Damascus that Syrian territory will not be used to harm Chinese interests; closer security coordination against what China calls “terrorism”; and — in the most troubling scenario from a human-rights standpoint — the potential deportation or handover of individuals Beijing deems a direct threat.
Ezat Wagdi Ba Awaidhan
Ezat Wagdi Ba Awaidhan, a Yemeni journalist and documentary filmmaker based in Washington, D.C., holds a master's degree in media studies.
